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PRIVATIZING EDUCATION WITH THE PUBLIC’S PURSE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2012 
GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON CHARTER SCHOOLS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Charter schools have recently become a hot topic of debate in the United States. For par-
ents who cannot afford private schooling or moving to another school district, charter schools 
seem to be an attractive option. These schools, which are often argued to outperform traditional 
schools, offer an alternative path to public education which allows teachers more flexibility to 
employ innovative strategies in the classroom. In order to expedite the creation of such schools, 
Republicans in the Georgia General Assembly called for the amending of the Georgia Constitu-
tion which would allow the state to approve charters by circumventing the publicly elected local 
school board. This study analyzes the more recent political history of the Commission, the debate 
surrounding the amendment, and ultimately the vote itself for Amendment 1. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, charter schools have recently become a popular alternative to 
traditional public schooling. Charter schools generally receive federal and state funding but are 
not subject to the same regulations and standards as their traditional counterparts. With more au-
tonomy for creativity and teaching innovations, families in failing school systems began flocking 
toward the idea of charter schools. In 2009, President Obama’s initiative “Race to the Top” 
sweetened the deal even more, granting federal money to states that created robust and innova-
tive strategies that addressed major challenges facing their educational systems (White House 
2013). The study presented here analyzes Georgia’s race towards charter schools.  
1.1 Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this study is to analyze the vote for Amendment 1, a ballot proposition 
from the 2012 Georgia General Election that would enable the state to create charter schools. Not 
only is this study relevant to understanding the growing support for charter schools; we can also 
draw many inferences about the relationship between charter school advocacy and voting behav-
ior by analyzing the vote. On November 6, 2012 Georgia made history as the first state to amend 
its constitution in favor of state-sponsored charter schools (O’Sullivan 2012). Therefore, analyz-
ing the vote for Amendment 1 in Georgia not only leads us to a better understanding of the dy-
namic support networks for charter schools but also serves as a model for prospective states 
looking to enact similar educational policies. The study begins by offering a detailed account of 
the recent charter schools debate in Georgia followed by an analysis of the campaign for and 
against the Amendment. Secondly, several camps of literature on voting behavior are introduced 
to serve as a roadmap for the model employed in this analysis. Lastly, by examining a host of 
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demographic, educational “need” and political variables, we make several general claims about 
the public’s attitude towards charter schools in the state of Georgia.  
1.1.1  Georgia Charter Schools Commission 
Should parents have the right to choose an alternative public school for their children if 
they feel that the existing system is underperforming? On the surface, the charter schools debate 
in Georgia focused primarily on the issue of school choice. For those who could not relocate to 
another school district or could not afford private schooling, charter schools seemed to offer a 
solution to parents desperately looking for change in their child’s education. But with local 
school boards not granting charter applications as fast as the Georgia legislature would have 
liked, politicians decided to step in. The idea was to create a state commission that would speed 
up the charter granting process and finally give parents and students an option for school choice. 
But once the commission actually began signing charters, the solution was not as promising as 
some may have hoped.  
  In 2008 the Georgia House Education Committee endorsed House Bill 881 which essen-
tially created a “back door for the state to divert local dollars to fund charter schools that the lo-
cal school boards did not want” (Downey 2011a). When then-governor Sonny Perdue signed HB 
881 into law on May 13, 2008 he authorized the creation of the Georgia Charter Schools Com-
mission, the bill’s prized progeny. This law allowed charter-seeking applicants to directly present 
their case to the GCSC for approval, an autonomous state-level entity, even if the request had 
been previously dismissed by the school board (Georgia General Assembly 2007-2008).  
 As one may predict, any time a governing body grants itself power (especially when that 
particular power was solely overseen by some other entity) problems naturally arise. The case of 
charter schools in Georgia was no exception. One such problem first and foremost usually con-
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cerns money. If we want to build new schools how shall they be funded? Before the GCSC, 
state-chartered schools were only authorized to receive federal and state funding (unlike tradi-
tional schools which receive federal, state and local monies); however, under the GCSC, com-
mission-chartered schools would receive funding at all three levels, even if the local board op-
posed the charter mandate in the first place (Downey 2011a).  
  In June 2009 state-charted schools strapped for cash and on the verge of closing their 
doors became eligible to receive local funding contingent upon GCSC reauthorization (Dodd 
2009). Though this was great news for existing state-chartered schools like the Ivy Preparatory 
Academy in Norcross and the Scholars Academy State Elementary in Riverdale who were in dire 
need of economic stimulus, local districts soon realized they had lost the power over their own 
purse (Dodd 2009).   
  The GCSC’s authority to approve charters and divvy up local dollars irrespective of the 
localities themselves represented legal loopholes at their finest. For many, the legislature was 
sending a message to local districts to “pay more, say less” (Downey 2011a). The issue of fund-
ing schools is especially concerning for many considering the frequency with which pundits and 
politicians often refer to the destitution of the educational system in America. On average, local 
districts provide about “45 percent of what it now costs to educate a child”; charter schools are 
hard-pressed to survive without it, and local districts cannot afford to save them (Downey 
2011a).  
  Local boards losing their voice as a result of the 2008 Act leads us to another problem, 
perhaps the most disputed, regarding the variety of constitutional and egalitarian oversights by 
the legislature. When Gwinnett Schools lost nearly $850,000 as a consequence of the Ivy Prepar-
atory Academy of Norcross receiving local matching funds when it reestablished its charter with 
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the GCSC, the rumors of lawsuits quickly became a reality (Dodd 2009b).  
  In 2010, seven school systems filed a case with the Fulton County Superior Court arguing 
that the state did not have the constitutional authority to grant local dollars to commission-
chartered schools.1 The arguments aligning on each side of the debate were fairly simple in theo-
ry. The GCSC either was or was not operating within the confines of the Georgia Constitution. 
Thomas Cox, who represented DeKalb and Atlanta public schools during the case argued that the 
“Constitution specifies that public education is under the management and control of county 
boards of education," not by state-created commissions (Dodd 2010). Conversely, Bruce Brown, 
an attorney representing the charter schools claimed that “nothing in the Georgia Constitution 
gives the local district a monopoly on public education” (Dodd 2010). In the end, Judge Wendy 
Shoob sided with the charter schools upholding the mechanism of local funding and maintaining 
the constitutionality of the GCSC.  
  Dissatisfied with the ruling, the public school systems appealed their case to the Georgia 
Supreme Court. The state high court focused primarily on the constitutionality and legitimacy of 
the GCSC (Downey 2011b). Chiefly, does the state have constitutional authority to create and 
fund charter schools “over the objection of local school boards?” (Downey 2011b). Lawyers rep-
resenting the state and the GCSC argued that the authority to create such schools was covered 
under the “special schools” provision in the state Constitution; however, state-run “special 
schools” have historically referred to institutions for the blind and deaf (Downey 2011b)2 or 
more recently, as vocational trade schools, schools for exceptional children, or schools for adult 
education (Gwinnett County School District 7). Fundamentally, the majority of the Georgia Su-
                                                 
1
 The seven school systems include Gwinnett, Atlanta, DeKalb, Bulloch, Candler, Henry, and Griffin public schools. 
2
 The Georgia Supreme Court majority disagreed with the state’s argument that the “special schools” provision in 
the Georgia Constitution of 1983 applied to charter schools because of the reasons outlined above and also because 
no charter schools existed in Georgia in 1983 (Gwinnett County School District 8, 2011). 
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preme Court rejected the argument that merely labeling a commission-chartered school as “spe-
cial” was enough to distinguish it as such. With the charter school defense unable to prove that 
such schools qualified as “special schools” the Georgia Supreme Court, in a 4-to-3 decision, re-
versed the Fulton County Superior Court decision and struck down the GCSC as unconstitution-
al. The ruling basically left 16 commission-chartered schools with illegal charters and some 
15,000 students without a school to attend (Dodd 2011). 
1.1.2 Campaign for a Charter School Amendment 
In the face of the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling and the now defunct GCSC, the Geor-
gia General Assembly began working to propose a constitutional amendment to voters that (if 
approved) would essentially give itself the power the state high court said it did not have. In the 
beginning of 2012, Senate Republicans asserted that amending the Constitution to “require local 
school boards to pass on local money to state-sponsored charter schools” was among its top pri-
ority (Torres 2012). In January, 2012 the amendment, House Resolution 1162, was introduced 
and contention quickly grew. Most of the controversy surrounding the charter school amendment 
centered on efforts to uncover the true purpose of the amendment.  
  Proponents of the GCSC and the amendment frequently claimed that a state commission 
was necessary to implement charter schools as the process was often stymied by local boards, 
despite the fact that Georgia charter schools grew from 35 to 119 in just a seven year period; fur-
thermore, the GCSC only chartered 8 operational schools during its less than 3 year existence 
(Downey 2012a). Others, like Tim Callahan of the Professional Association of Georgia Educa-
tors, claimed that the real purpose of the amendment was about “tapping into local funds without 
the local board having approved the charter school” (Downey 2012a). Opponents feared that the 
amendment would allow the state to essentially create its own “parallel K-12 system” and fund it 
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though voiceless local systems under the guise that charter schools equal success, for which little 
empirical evidence exists (Downey 2012a). As a whole, the opposition to the charter school 
amendment is most easily classified as a coalition of interest groups. Professional educational 
and civil rights groups came out in overwhelming numbers to voice their disapproval for 
Amendment 1 including the Georgia Association of Educational Leaders (GAEL), the Georgia 
School Boards Association (GSBA), The League of Women Voters of Georgia, and the NAACP 
(Robinson 2012; Blau 2012). 
 From a partisan perspective, the charter school debate highlights an even more fervent 
dynamic between state Republicans and Democrats. Firstly, the charter school amendment was 
one of the top legislative priorities among a Republican-dominated legislature which drew little 
support from Democrats (Wingfield 2012). Secondly, the burgeoning movement toward charter 
schools since 2008 enjoyed great support from both Republican Georgia governors; in May, pre-
sent governor Nathan Deal even went as far to promise state funding to a few schools who lost 
their charter (as a result of the state Supreme Court’s ruling) contingent upon the passage of the 
amendment in the 2012 General Election in November (Thornton 2012). On the other hand, the 
State Democratic Party outright opposed the amendment, financial provisions from out-of-state 
wealthy Republicans were heavily scrutinized, and “civil-rights icon” Rev. Joseph Lowery 
“slammed [the proposed amendment] in a radio ad…as a precursor to resegregation” (Wingfield 
2012). 
  However, partisan affiliation does not predict support or opposition for either side. For 
example, Georgia State Schools Superintendent Dr. John Barge, a Republican, outlined the rea-
sons he opposed the amendment in a statement three months prior to the election: “I cannot sup-
port the creation of a new and costly state bureaucracy that takes away local control of schools 
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and unnecessarily duplicates the good work already being done by local districts” (Downey 
2012b). All things together, this suggests that the rallying forces for and against charter schools 
consisted of broad, diverse coalitions rather than restrictive partisan groupings. 
 Attempting to draw a line for amendment support down party lines is even messier when 
we take the disjointed Tea Party into consideration. Throughout the debate, the Georgia Tea Par-
ty struggled to find a unified voice in the face of the charter school amendment. For example, the 
Savannah Tea Party strongly endorsed the amendment claiming that there was nothing but posi-
tive benefits to be gained, while Atlanta Tea Party activists agreed with the opposition movement 
that such an amendment was an unnecessary expansion of government power (Barrow 2012a). 
Interestingly, “both tea party camps say their position is rooted in tea party principles, like small 
government, local control and market competition” (Barrow 2012a). But despite all of the law-
suits and rulings, the contention between politicians and the school board, and the ardent activ-
ism between Democratic and Republican leaders, the only thing that mattered now was how 
Georgia citizens would vote in the November election.  
1.1.3 Voting Behavior 
The heart of this study analyzes the percent “yes” vote for Amendment 1 across all 159 
counties of Georgia. The purpose of this analysis is to estimate which demographic, political, 
and/or educational “need” variables most likely led to the 58 to 42 percent victory of the charter 
school amendment. Georgia’s Amendment 1 is a superior case for charter school analysis, not 
only because it provides insight into a nationwide political and educational trend, but also be-
cause Georgia was the first state to amend its constitution in support of charter schools 
(O’Sullivan 2013).  Secondly, analyzing the voters who are and are not receptive to charter 
schools could serve as a very useful tool for other states looking to make charter schools a bigger 
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part of their educational environment. Lastly, a general analysis of this rather unique piece of 
legislation provides invaluable information on the democratic process, checks and balances in 
state government, and sheds new light on voter behavior on charter school state ballot proposi-
tions.  
  Because there is no specific literature which solely focuses on voting behavior on state 
charter school ballot propositions, the theoretical model for this study consists of an amalgama-
tion of voting behavior, state ballot proposition, and tax initiative literature. Most studies on vot-
ing behavior in ballot measures identify several key demographic and political variables that 
drive support and participation including race, persons aged over 65, college education, income, 
homeownership, and party identification (Sears and Citrin 1982; Button 1993; Jung 2002; 
Branton 2003; Dyck 2010). Therefore, we should expect these variables to have some type of 
influence in the model for this analysis. According to James Button’s (1993, 38) study on racial 
cleavages in local voting, he found that African Americans more consistently supported educa-
tional ballot measures than Whites. Building off Button, this study recognizes that strong racial 
cleavages have the capacity to divide regions along the traditional sense of a “color line” which 
can significantly impact voter preferences. Therefore, we should expect to see substantial vari-
ance in support for the charter school amendment between rural and metropolitan areas especial-
ly considering that nearly 70 percent of the entire African American population in Georgia reside 
in the state’s three largest metropolitan areas: Atlanta, Augusta, and Columbus.3   
  Several studies analyzing voting behavior on SPLOST (Special Purpose Local Option 
Sales Tax) initiatives in Georgia are also relevant to this analysis because one of the chief con-
cerns by amendment opponents is that a state charter school commission, which aims to reappor-
                                                 
3
 This hypothesis is also in accordance with Sanders and Lee’s 2009 analysis of 398 ESPLOST initiatives where the 
authors find significant variance in ESPLOST support between metro and rural counties.  
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tion local dollars, could put an unnecessary burden on taxpayers.  This anti-tax sentiment is often 
operationalized in SPLSOT studies by examining the percentage of persons aged over 65 while 
more general economic self-interest variables analyze percentage of homeowners and household 
income per county (Jung 2002; Sanders and Lee 2009; LaPlant and LaPlant 2012). In accordance 
with these previous works, this study also expects to find a significant relationship between these 
economic self-interest variables and support for Amendment 1.  
 Lastly, this study incorporates a handful of sociological and educational studies to devel-
op “educational need” variables for the purposes of this analysis; the “need” for charter schools 
is most frequently operationalized by graduation rates, drop out rates and standardized test scores 
(Archbald 2004; Lauen 2009; Davies and Aurini 2011). This study exclusively analyzes gradua-
tion rates in order to avoid problems with collinearity instead of assessing graduation and drop-
out rates together. Together, the political history leading to the charter school aendment and the 
literature on voting behavior guides a set of expected results. 
1.2 Expected Results  
According to the most relevant political science literature associated with this analysis 
and the history of the charter schools debate in Georgia we can expect certain variable direction-
alities in our dataset. First in terms of our demographic variables, if the statements were true that 
the Georgia electorate was fearful that the passage of Amendment 1 would increase property tax-
es and create an unnecessary tax burden then we would expect counties with a higher percentage 
of persons aged 65 and over to have a negative impact on the “yes” vote for the amendment, 
which would be in accordance with all of the aforementioned SPLOST studies in Georgia. Con-
versely, counties with a higher percentage of persons aged 18 and younger may represent a de-
mographic “need” for better schools. As the youth percentage increases among counties we ex-
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pect support to increase for Amendment 1. Race is another key issue in this analysis. Recalling 
Button’s work, we would expect counties with a higher African American population to vote yes 
for the amendment as well. Household income is another variable we expect to vary in interac-
tion with other variables. To one extent we expect more affluent areas to support charter schools 
because they have the capacity to spot local funding; while on the other hand, less affluent areas 
may also support charter schools as a means to improve the educational system. We should ex-
pect support to change among race and partisanship as the levels of household income vary as 
this is one of the best self-interested economic variables in the dataset. 
Second, if the premier argument for charter school advocacy rests upon the “need” for 
educational reform, then there are several variables that should elucidate this claim. One of such 
variables includes graduation rates. The lower the graduation rate by county, the more support 
we should expect for Amendment 1. Per pupil spending (PPS) is another measure that should 
validate the claim that charter schools will assuage failing systems. School systems with low PPS 
may contribute to underperformance, leading parents to seek charter schools as an alternative 
educational path for their children. We should also approach the issue of PPS with a caveat. 
More money does not always equal more success. As a matter of fact, comparing PPS to the 
most recent Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) report from the Department of Education indicates 
that some of the worst school systems in Georgia receive the most funding. Therefore, counties 
with higher PPS may also be more inclined to support Amendment 1. Lastly, we examine the 
average score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) by county to assess performance. Again, 
counties with lower aggregate SAT scores may be inclined to support Amendment 1.  
Lastly, we will examine several political predictors of the Amendment 1 “yes” vote. The 
primary political predictor for this study is the percentage of Republican voters in the county. 
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Since the amendment was almost singularly a Republican initiative in the Georgia legislature, we 
would expect Republican constituents to vote in favor of the amendment. Keeping in mind that 
Georgia republicans were also divided on the amendment, especially differing Tea Party coali-
tions, we have also incorporated a variable which measure factionalism by county. The precurso-
ry idea is that support for the amendment will be greater in counties where the Republican party 
is more unified. Turnout is another measure that we expect to capture voting sentiment on the 
amendment. According to Jung’s (2002, 26) SPLOST referenda study, he uncovered an inverse 
relationship between the “yes” vote and turnout. If the “yes” vote decreases while turnout in-
creases, it should speak to the magnitude of support for the amendment. Finally, we examine a 
geopolitical measure which examines the “yes” vote among rural and metropolitan areas in 
Georgia. Because charter schools are often associated with affluence, we expect the “yes” vote to 
increase in metropolitan areas. 
2     METHODOLOGY 
  The dependent variable of this study is the percent “yes” vote by county across all 159 
Georgia counties. The dependent variable is coded as a percentage rather than a dichotomous 
variable so we can obtain the most precise results possible. Considering the characteristics of the 
data we employ the use of an Ordinary Least-Squares Regression Model. In order to account for 
heteroskedasticity among the 11 key independent variables of analysis, the model also uses ro-
bust standard errors. The remainder of this section explains in depth how the independent varia-
bles of analysis were obtained, measured, coded and also displays the general characteristics of 
each variable.  
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2.1 Data and Variables 
This study examines the “yes” vote for Amendment 1 in the November 2012 General 
Election in Georgia as the dependent variable across all 159 counties. Each county was coded 
with its respective percentage “yes” vote for Amendment 1. The independent variables of this 
study consist of demographic, educational “need” and political variables which are theoretically 
expected to predict the outcome of the election. Since the dependent variable unit of analysis is a 
county-level measure, all independent variables are coded as aggregate county measures. The 
following sections explain the operationalization of variables in detail. 
2.1.1 Demographics 
  As suggested from a broad literature on voting behavior, tax initiative referenda, and bal-
lot propositions, this study analyzes five major demographic predictors. Percentage of persons 
aged 65 and older, percentage of persons 18 and under, percentage with a Bachelor’s degree, 
percentage African American, and average household income were all obtained from the Census 
Bureau State and County QuickFacts for the year 2012. All independent variables in this section 
are measured as aggregate percentages while the household income variable is reported as an av-
erage measure for each county. 
2.1.2 Educational “Need”  
 To test whether educational “need” was a significant factor in the “yes” vote for 
Amendment 1 we analyze three variables: graduation rates, per pupil spending, and composite 
SAT scores. Four-year graduation rate data for the 2012 school year was obtained to assess 
“need” for alternative school choice options.4  This measure captures the percentage of students 
in each county who are expected to graduate “on time” or within 4 years. Per pupil expenditures 
                                                 
4
 Data obtained from the Atlanta Journal Constitution online database http://www.myajc.com/news/ga-grad-rates-
2012/ 
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were obtained from the financial reports of the Georgia Department of Education for 2012.5 
Lastly, composite SAT scores were collected for each county in 2012. This measure includes the 
average composite score among students for the entire county. 6 
2.1.3 Political Predictors 
  The last group of variables examine four political predictors of the “yes” vote. First, the 
average GOP vote in presidential elections from 2000-2012 was calculated as a proxy for Repub-
licanism in each county.7 For all four elections, the total number of votes cast for the GOP presi-
dential candidate was calculated as a percentage of the entire vote from each county. Percentages 
for each year were then averaged to yield a comprehensive measure of Republicanism for each 
county.  
  Capturing party dynamics at the county level can be difficult to measure. In association 
with the GOP measure, another variable has been created which aims to account for divisions (or 
factionalism) within the Republican Party. Since votes cast in a presidential election might not 
have the capacity to illuminate the nuances of local politics, a gubernatorial measure aims to cap-
ture the degree of factionalism in the GOP by county. Analyzing the 2010 Republican Guberna-
torial Primary races by county may paint a more accurate picture of party dynamics in Georgia. 
For each county, the Republican gubernatorial candidate who received the second-most votes 
was subtracted from the candidate who received the most votes in that county.8 Therefore, small-
er values on this measure indicate there was a greater deal of competition, or that the GOP may 
have been factionalized. Larger values of this measure are interpreted to indicate cohesion 
                                                 
5
 Values refer to the Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) student expenditures. Data obtained from the Georgia Department 
of Education online financial report database. http://app3.doe.k12.ga.us/ows-
bin/owa/fin_pack_revenue.display_proc  
6
 Data obtained from AJC online database: http://www.myajc.com/news/ga-sat-scores-2013/ 
7
 Election results available for all years available at the Georgia Secretary of State website.  
8
 2010 Republican gubernatorial primary election results can be found at the Georgia Secretary of State Website. 
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(unifactionalism) in the party. This measure is intended to illuminate not only divisions within 
the GOP itself, but also the lack of unity between the two Tea Party camps positioned on each 
side of the charter school debate. 
 Turnout percentages were obtained from the election returns of the 2012 General Election 
from the Georgia Secretary of State.9 Lastly, the model also accounts for whether each county is 
part of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Rural counties are coded 0 and metropolitan coun-
ties are coded as 1.10 Variable characteristics including minimum, maximum, and mean values 
can be found in the appendix. 
3 RESULTS 
  The following sections present the preliminary results of the OLS model and offer several 
explanations for the findings. In particular, this section examines how county-level dynamics, 
interactions between key independent variables, and the ballot language of the amendment influ-
enced the “yes” vote. 
3.1 Preliminary Results 
The table below represents the preliminary results of our model. Notice that Table 3.1 
consists of two separate models. Two of our independent variables, “Republican” and “Percent 
Black”, are highly correlated; for this reason two models have been created to adequately show 
the significance of each variable in the model.11 Model 1, which includes the GOP measure, re-
turned with six statistically significant variables.  
 
                                                 
9
 Data obtained from: www.sos.ga.gov 
10
 Data from the Census Bureau on Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/defhist.html 
11
 Independent variables “Republican” and “Percentage Black” were correlated at -0.9011, indicating that both are 
nearly identically inverted measures of one another. Therefore, running two separate models demonstrates the pre-
dictive power of both variables. 
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Table 3.1 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1 
  
  N=152       N=152      
  F-14.02       F=15.19       
  r2=.052       r2=0.50        
 
Percent over 65, household income and metropolitan areas all had positive coefficients. We can 
interpret these results as following: counties with higher percentages of persons aged over 65, 
with higher household incomes, in metropolitan areas were most likely to vote “yes” for the 
amendment. On the other hand, graduation rates, how Republican a county is, and magnitude of 
turnout were all negative predictors of the “yes” vote. Some of these results counter our original 
Model 1                                 Standard 
Variable             Coefficient     Error    p-value 
 Model 2                            Standard 
 Variable        Coefficient     Error    p-value 
Demographics     Demographics    
   Percent  Over 65  .548 .250 .030    Percent Over 65 .459 .243 .061 
   Percent 18 and     
   Under -.035 .272 .897 
   Percent 18 and   
   Under -.182 .280 .518 
   Percent with  
   Bachelor’s  -.069 .138 .619 
   Percent with   
   Bachelor’s .077 .128 .550 
   Percent Black -- -- --    Percent Black .169 .048 .001 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .000 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .000 
Educational Need    Educational Need    
   Graduation Rate  -.115 .058 .051    Graduation Rate -.115 .062 .066 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending -.000 .001 .955 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending .000 .000 .663 
   Average SAT .003 .009 .772    Average SAT -.003 .009 .716 
Political Predictors    Political Predictors    
   Republican -.315 .067 .000    Republican -- -- -- 
   Faction .012 .042 .771    Faction .031 .043 .470 
   Turnout -.203 .076 .009    Turnout -.265 .087 .003 
   Metro Area 3.120 1.247 .014    Metro Area 4.010 1.285 .002 
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expectations. The remainder of this section aims to explain these results and offer supplemental 
models.  
  First, we will talk about the directionalities we correctly predicted for Model 1.  
Household income was correctly predicted to have a significant impact on the percent “yes” vote 
for Amendment 1. Again, this most likely captures the reality that charter schools thrive in more 
affluent areas because of the need for financial donations.  
The relationship between graduation rates and support for Amendment 1 were also cor-
rectly predicted. According to the model, as graduation rates increase, which aim to serve as a 
proxy for successful educational systems, support for the amendment decreases. Therefore, 
Georgians in school districts with higher graduation rates may have not seen a “need” for educa-
tional improvement and voted against the amendment.  
Turnout was also a significant predictor in the model and reaffirmed the Jung’s findings 
on SPLOST referenda. In regards to Amendment 1, counties with higher turnout rates were sig-
nificantly less likely to vote “yes” for the amendment. As Jung suggests, it may be the case that 
charter school legislation is more likely to pass in special elections which typically have lower 
turnout than general elections (Jung 2002, 27). 
 Lastly, metropolitan areas were a strong predictor of support for the amendment as ex-
pected. Support in these areas is likely attributable to higher affluence and the black vote. This 
relationship is highlighted in Model 2, which incorporates the African American variable, where 
the p-value for metropolitan areas increases from .014 to .002. This result also confirms Button’s 
work that African Americans are much more likely to support educational ballot propositions. 
Shifting to our variables which yielded counter-intuitive results, percent over 65, was a 
positive predictor, which was unexpected. It may be the case that older Georgians were more 
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knowledgeable about the amendment, or that this group is more likely to have chil-
dren/grandchildren and are more invested in the issue. Following tables will examine interactions 
effects to determine if any such relationships exist. 
 However, what is perhaps most interesting about the results is that the GOP average 
measure has a negative coefficient. What this means is that as a county becomes more Republi-
can, the likelihood it will support Amendment 1 decreases. This is a striking result because the 
amendment itself was largely a Republican effort in the Georgia legislature, and according to the 
literature, Republicans tend to support charter schools more than Democrats. Interpreting these 
results in the same manner as above, for every 1 percent increase in the Republican measure the 
“yes” vote for Amendment 1 decreases by .31 percent. The following section aims to clarify the-
se counter-intuitive results. 
3.1.1 The County-Level Dynamic 
  Since our model does not show support for Amendment 1 among the Republican elec-
torate this leads us to first think that perhaps the GOP measure we have created does not ade-
quately capture the nuances of local politics. Therefore, the following tables try to account for 
these shortcomings. Theoretically speaking, we should see differences between rural and metro-
politan Republicans in Georgia (Gimpel and Karnes 2006).12 Therefore, each county’s metropoli-
tan status has been designated by our metropolitan variable (1=metro 0=rural). Juxtaposing met-
ro and rural areas, we can see a clearer image of county-level dynamics. Table 3.2 shows the re-
sults for Models 1 and 2 in metropolitan counties only.  
  Notice when we control for metropolitan counties the percent of the population with a 
Bachelor’s degree becomes statistically significant with a negative coefficient. In other words, 
                                                 
12
 Gimpel and Karnes’ “The Rural Side of the Urban-Rural Gap” argue there are major differences in voting behav-
ior between rural and urban residents even within the same state. Their data shows that the rural American vote is 
becoming increasingly Republican while more populous areas appear markedly less so. 
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for every 1 percent increase in persons with a Bachelor’s degree support for Amendment 1 de-
creases by .46 percent. 
Table 3.2 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1 in Metropolitan Counties 
Model 1                                 Standard 
Variable             Coefficient     Error    p-value 
 Model 2                            Standard 
 Variable        Coefficient     Error    p-value 
Demographics     Demographics    
   Percent  Over 65  -.382 .397 .340    Percent Over 65 -.665 .335 .052 
   Percent 18 and     
   Under -.560 .435 .204 
   Percent 18 and   
   Under -.957 .389 .017 
   Percent with  
   Bachelor’s  -.461 .159 .006 
   Percent with   
   Bachelor’s -.373 .145 .013 
   Percent Black -- -- --    Percent Black .309 .057 .000 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .000 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .000 
Educational Need    Educational Need    
   Graduation Rate  -.010 .089 .906    Graduation Rate -.037 .069 .588 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending -.000 .001 .558 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending -.000 .001 .811 
   Average SAT .002 .010 .823    Average SAT .006 .011 .550 
Political Predictors    Political Predictors    
   Republican -.412 .082 .000    Republican -- -- -- 
   Faction .011 .054 .838    Faction .003 .056 .961 
   Turnout -.134 .086 .125    Turnout -.250 .087 .006 
    N = 66      N = 66 
                 F=13.62      F=16.06 
                 r2 = 0.61      r2 = 0.66  
 
The negative relationship between education and support for Amendment 1 is also elucidated in a 
public opinion poll by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution from October 2012. According to the 
poll, persons with no college education supported the amendment by 45 percent, while those 
with a college education only supported the amendment by 38 percent; furthermore, 53 percent 
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of those with a college education favor strengthening public schools while those with no college 
education only support strengthening schools by 49 percent (Charter School Amendment Poll 
2012). When it comes to supporting more options for school choice, college educated and non-
college educated support is 37 and 41 percent respectively (Charter School Amendment Poll 
2012). Educated persons likely oppose the amendment because they believe that the best way to 
strengthen schools is by improving the preexisting educational infrastructure. More educated 
persons may also be aware of how the amendment would negatively affect local school funding. 
  Household income and the Republican measure remain significant predictors in Model 1. 
Table 3.2 shows that Republicans in metropolitan areas are still less likely to support the 
amendment, but what is most fascinating are the results from Model 2. When we control for met-
ropolitan areas in Model 2 every single demographic variable is significant. Again, this speaks to 
the importance of the black vote for the amendment. Demographics may have a greater explana-
tory power than partisanship when it comes to analyzing who is most likely to support the charter 
schools amendment in metropolitan areas. Below, Table 3.3 breaks down the models by rural 
counties. Interestingly, Model 1 (GOP Model) does a much better job at predicting the “yes” vote 
in rural counties than it does in metropolitan counties. These tables reaffirm Gimpel and Karnes’ 
(2006) findings that there in fact appears to be a wide gap between rural and urban voting behav-
ior. Most directionalities of independent variables are consistent through each model, except for 
the education variable. Notice, when we reduce the model to rural counties only, percent with a 
Bachelor’s degree becomes a positive predictor of the “yes” vote for both the GOP Model and 
the Black Model. Persons from rural counties clearly have a different attitude about charter 
schools. 
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Table 3.3 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1 in Rural Counties 
  N=86       N=86 
 F=8.25       F=5.39 
 r2=0.38       r2=0.31      
 
  We can draw several distinctions about the charter school amendment from these models. 
First, race is more important in metropolitan areas than rural areas. The Black Metro Model from 
Table 3.2 yielded six statistically significant variables as opposed to the three significant varia-
bles yielded from the GOP Metro Model. Second, every single demographic predictor was sig-
nificant in the Black Model. Third, no educational or political predictors were significant in the 
Black Metropolitan Model, expect for turnout. Therefore, we can be confident that demographics 
Model 1                                 Standard 
Variable             Coefficient     Error    p-value 
 Model 2                            Standard 
 Variable        Coefficient     Error    p-value 
Demographics     Demographics    
   Percent  Over 65  .644 .270 .020    Percent Over 65 .437 .275 .117 
   Percent 18 and     
   Under -.205 .278 .464 
   Percent 18 and   
   Under -.386 .308 .214 
   Percent with  
   Bachelor’s  .490 .228 .035 
   Percent with   
   Bachelor’s .623 .232 .009 
   Percent Black -- -- --    Percent Black .108 .076 .160 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .039 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .157 
Educational Need    Educational Need    
   Graduation Rate  -.203 .076 .009    Graduation Rate -.186 .089 .041 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending -3.19 .001 .998 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending .000 .001 .467 
   Average SAT .011 .012 .354    Average SAT -.000 .001 .467 
Political Predictors    Political Predictors    
   Republican -.353 .093 .000    Republican -- -- -- 
   Faction .086 .065 .184    Faction .086 .074 .246 
   Turnout -.379 .149 .013    Turnout -.399 .171 .023 
played a major role influencing the “yes” vote in metropolitan counties. On the other hand, the 
Rural Model tells a different story. With completely inverse results, the GOP Rural Model y
ed six statistically significant variables while the Black Rural Model only yielded three. The 
GOP Rural Model shows significant predictors in all three categories (demographic, educational 
“need”, and political). Fascinatingly, percent African America
cant in the Black Rural Model. This may lead one to conclude that support for Amendment 1 was 
based more on race and demographics in metropolitan areas while support in rural areas was 
more political or “need” based. 
  Below, Figure 3.1 highlights the percent “yes” vote by county type. Of the 159 counties 
in Georgia, 83 voted in favor of Amendment 1 (52 percent). Majority of “yes” votes came from 
metropolitan areas while nearly 75 percent of the “no” vote came from rural
quarter of metropolitan counties voted against the amendment.
Figure 3.1 Percent “Yes” Vote by County Type
Metro No Vote
Rural No Vote
Metro Yes Vote Rural Yes Vote
n was not even statistically signif
 counties. Only a 
 
 
 
Metro Yes Vote
31%
Rural Yes Vote
21%
12%
36%
Metro No Vote Rural No Vote
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3.1.2 Interaction Effects 
The previous sections have argued that county-level dynamics, such as whether a county 
is rural or metropolitan may have influenced voters’ support for Amendment 1. This section ar-
gues there are key ways in which the main independent variables of interest interact with one an-
other that may also influence the “yes” vote. 
Below, Table 3.4 examines three different types of interaction effects between the aver-
age GOP measure and percent African American. Here we are interested in determining how 
both models react when interacted with other significant variables. In the GOP Interaction Model 
we have interacted the average Republican vote variable with percent with a Bachelor’s degree, 
percent 65 and over and turnout. Percent 65 and over was chosen as an interaction term because 
we originally expected this variable to yield a negative coefficient. Interacting this variable with 
the average Republican vote may shed light on why both variables produced counter-intuitive 
findings. Percent with a Bachelor’s degree was chosen because the directionality of coefficients 
shifted when controlling for metropolitan and rural areas. Lastly, the turnout measure is used an 
interaction term to test for consistency in its significance and directionality. The Black Interac-
tion Model tests the same three interactions with the percent African American variable.  
The GOP Interaction Model from Table 3.4 yields seven statistically significant results. 
When controlling for the GOP interaction terms, the percent over 65 coefficient becomes nega-
tive, as we originally expected. Furthermore, the interaction terms between the average Republi-
can vote and percent with a Bachelor’s degree and percent over 65 are significant with positive 
coefficients. These interactions tell us a lot about the effect of how “Republican” a county is and 
its effect on the “yes” vote for Amendment 1. Without taking interaction terms into account, the 
“Republican” proxy for counties had a negative relationship with the dependent variable.  
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Table 3.4 OLS Regression of “Yes” Votes on Amendment 1 with Interaction Variables 
Model 1                                 Standard 
Variable             Coefficient     Error    p-value 
 Model 2                            Standard 
 Variable        Coefficient     Error    p-value 
Demographics     Demographics    
   Percent  Over 65  -2.091 .920 .024    Percent Over 65 1.068 .286 .000 
   Percent 18 and     
   Under -.025 .271 .925 
   Percent 18 and   
   Under -.079 .297 .791 
   Percent with  
   Bachelor’s  -.698 .267 .010 
   Percent with   
   Bachelor’s .095 .186 .611 
   Percent Black -- -- --    Percent Black .302 .350 .390 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .000 
   Household  
   Income .000 .000 .000 
Educational Need    Educational Need    
   Graduation Rate  -.135 .057 .019    Graduation Rate -.136 .063 .034 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending -.000 .000 .841 
   Per Pupil  
   Spending .000 .000 .740 
   Average SAT -.000 .009 .932    Average SAT -.008 .008 .356 
Political Predictors    Political Predictors    
   Republican -.228 .382 .551    Republican -- -- -- 
   Faction -.011 .046 .800    Faction .005 .044 .902 
   Turnout .481 .450 .283    Turnout -.343 .152 .025 
   Metro Area 3.56 1.239 .005  Metro Area 3.870 1.304 .004 
Interactions     Interactions    
   GOP*Bachelors .010 .005 .034    Black*Bachelors -.002 .004 .586 
   GOP*65 .039 .013 .003    Black*65 -.029 .008 .000 
   GOP*Turnout -.011 .007 .152    Black*Turnout .004 .006 .460 
    N = 152      N = 152 
                 F=21.32      F=16.01 
                 r2 = 0.54      r2 = 0.53 
 
However, when we examine how “Republican” a county is respective to the percentage of Bach-
elor degrees within that county, the model yields a positive and highly significant relationship.   
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  The same is true for the relationship between the average Republican measure and the 
percent of the population aged 65 and over. The more “Republican” a county becomes is a signif-
icant predictor of support for Amendment 1 when interacted with the percent of the population 
aged over 65. In the Black Interaction Model we see that the percent over 65 variable coefficient  
is positive and significant, as it has been in most models; however, when percent over 65 is inter-
acted with percent African American, the term yields a negative coefficient. The results from this 
table may indicate that age plays a significant role in the charter school debate. If we treat the 
average Republican vote and percent African American measures as proxies for conservatism 
and liberalism respectively, then we might conclude that older conservative s were more likely to 
support the amendment while older liberals were less likely to support the amendment. Further-
more, considering that the Georgia Democratic Party outright opposed Amendment 1 may have 
signaled hardcore democrats, especially blacks aged 65 and over who grew up during the Civil 
Rights movement, may have simply followed that State Party’s lead, even though African Amer-
icans are more likely to support educational ballot propositions. Overall, the Interaction Models 
contribute to our understanding of which types of coalitions were most likely to support or op-
pose the amendment.   
3.1.3 Ballot Language 
The last area to examine regarding Amendment 1 is the ballot language itself. It would 
not be much of a stretch to say that for many Georgians, the first time they had heard or even 
read about the propositions for Amendment 1 may have been when they deciding whether or not 
to vote “yes” at their polling place. For those who may have been unfamiliar with the amend-
ment, the ballot language itself seemed rather innocent. The official ballot language for Amend-
ment 1 read as follows: Shall the Constitution of Georgia be amended to allow state or local ap-
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proval of public charter schools upon the request of local communities? Notice that nowhere is 
any mention made to the extraneous State Commission that would be created (or reinstated) to 
override decisions made by local school boards. Nor is there any mention made on the fact that 
the approving the amendment would allow the state to take public money away from local school 
systems and give that money to the same charter schools that had previously been denied appli-
cation by the local system.  
Opponents of the amendment argued that the ballot language was “intentionally mislead-
ing” and was likely the chief reason why the amendment passed by such a large margin of 58.5-
42.5 (Bailey-Covin 2012). Even State Senator Vincent Ford (D-Atlanta) accused proponents of 
“using vague ballot language…to confuse voters about the real intent of the proposal” (Barrow 
2012b). It is certainly a fact that out of the nearly 3.8 million votes cast for Amendment 1 there 
were at least a few voters who had never even heard of the charter school amendment until they 
were already casting their votes. Bearing this in mind, it is certainly true that a large number of 
Georgia voters were likely hoodwinked into voting “yes” for a constitutional amendment they 
knew little about. As a matter of fact, after the election there were a flurry of reports from Geor-
gia voters who claimed they were unsure of what the amendment would actually do. This may 
also explain why the amendment passed with 58.5 percent electoral support, 11 percentage 
points higher than a local poll just weeks before the election (Huddleston 2012). The ballot lan-
guage for the amendment should not be overlooked as a major component that lead to the 17 
point margin of victory.  
4     CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, this research has presented a handful of models which aimed to predict support 
for the charter schools amendment. First, the research has shown that there are vast differences 
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among voters and their perception towards charter schools in rural and metropolitan areas. The 
Metropolitan Model showed that demographics including age, race, income and education were 
the best predictors of support for the amendment while the rural vote was more influenced by 
political and educational “need” variables. The research also shows that rural counties over-
whelming voted against the amendment, but the tremendous support from metropolitan counties 
ultimately led to the amendment’s passage on Election Day. It makes sense that the amendment 
gained major support from metropolitan counties considering that the bottom five performing 
high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools for the entire state are found exclusively in 
the Atlanta, Fulton, and Cobb County school systems (Best, worst schools 2013).  
The Interaction Models also demonstrated that age and partisanship were major predic-
tors of support. If we treat the interaction of the average Republican vote and percentage of per-
sons over 65 as a coalition of conservatism and the interaction of percent black with percent over 
65 as a coalition of liberalism, there are clear divisions of support and opposition respectively. 
Lastly, examining the ballot language itself explains why the amendment passed by such a large 
margin of victory. Together, this research paints an intricate picture of charter school support by 
examining county-level dynamics, key interaction effects, and the actual substance of the 
amendment itself. 
  Even though most of the models incorrectly predicted support for Amendment 1 among 
Republicans and seniors, we may have simply misclassified their positions. It may be the case 
that Republicans in the electorate captured anti-tax sentiment, not Georgia seniors, which would 
have made the model more accurate. As mentioned earlier, counties with more persons aged over 
65 may represent more individuals with children and grandchildren, causing this demographic 
group to be more invested in the quality of education. However, no one model presented in this 
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research was able to show a positive significant relationship between percent over 65 and percent 
under 18 at the same time. 
   This study raises several important questions regarding the future of charter 
schools in the United States.  Are charter schools really the answer to failing traditional school 
systems? There exists an impressive literature relating successful movements towards charter 
schools linked with the revitalization of traditional community structure (Warren 2005). The au-
thor argues that the most successful initiatives towards educational reform are complimented by 
strong community structures. Simply implanting a charter school into a dysfunctional community 
provides no guarantee for success just like transplanting failing democracies in a war-torn coun-
ties. Then there is the debate over whether or not charter schools are more successful than tradi-
tional public schools. Despite the persistent rhetoric that charter schools are the solution to fail-
ing public schools, a recent study out of Stanford University shows that only 17 percent of char-
ter schools actually outperform their traditional counterparts (Cox 2011).  
  Lastly, this analysis makes clear that the charter school debate in Georgia was far more 
complicated than a Republican legislature pushing through conservative legislation in a red state. 
On the contrary, this study demonstrates that the charter school debate was contested most in 
partisan counties.13 The charter school debate should be understood not as a battle between ideo-
logues, but rather as a broad coalition of the college educated, seniors, African Americans, the 
affluent, rural and metropolitan citizens alike fighting to improve the future of the educational 
system for Georgia students. Georgia received national attention as a result of the Amendment 1 
                                                 
13
 Though the “Faction” variable was not a significant predictor of support in any of the models there are some in-
teresting facts that should be observed. The mean faction score for Georgia counties was 9.08, or that the average 
Gubernatorial candidate won by 9 points. When we examine faction scores below the mean, which range all the way 
to .14, we end up with 78 “factionalized” to “highly factionalized” counties. From these 52.6 percent voted against 
Amendment 1. Even when we examine factionalism scores above the mean which range all the way to 
“unifactionalism” 43.2 percent of those counties also voted against the amendment. This is powerful evidence that 
Amendment 1 was not a singularly partisan issue. 
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victory, becoming the first state to amend its constitution to support charter schools (Klein, 
2012). Only time will tell what kind of precedent Georgia has set for the rest of the nation.  
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APPENDIX  
Variables, Characteristics and Sources 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Source 
“Yes” Vote for 
Amendment One 
(Nov 6, 2012) 
25.75 71.44 50.53 8.80 GA Secretary of State Elections 
Division 
Percent of popula-
tion over 65 (2011) 
3.7 30.9 13.95 3.70 Census Bureau State and Coun-
ty QuickFacts 
Percent of the popu-
lation 18 and under 
(2012) 
14.6 29.7 12.89 2.95 Census Bureau State and Coun-
ty QuickFacts 
Percent with a 
Bachelor’s Degree 
(2006-2010) 
4.7 47.6 15.81 8.48 Census Bureau State and Coun-
ty QuickFacts 
Percent Black 
(2011) 
.7 73 28.35 17.23 Census Bureau State and Coun-
ty QuickFacts 
Average GOP vote 
in Presidential Elec-
tions (2000-2012) 
20.44 81.05 60.88 12.47 GA Secretary of State Elections 
Division 
Factionalism (July 
2010) 
.14 57.03 13.09 11.60 GA Secretary of State Elections 
Division 
Metropolitan Area 
(2003) 
0 1 .433 .497 Census Bureau Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas 
Population by Coun-
ty (2010) 
246 949599 61654.65 129950.5 Census Bureau State and Coun-
ty QuickFacts 
Median Household 
Income (2006-2010) 
22188 87605 40222.14 11348.45 Census Bureau State and Coun-
ty QuickFacts 
High School Gradu-
ation Rate Percent-
age (2012) 
45.3 93.3 73.10 9.08 Atlanta Journal Constitution 
Online Database 
Per Pupil Spending 
(2012) 
4307.76 10535.48 5758.80 695.4158 Georgia De-partment of Ed-
ucation 
Average SAT Scores 1027 1580 1347.9 96.67 
Atlanta Journal 
Constitution 
Online Database 
Turnout 36.25 85.82 72.78 5.93 Georgia Secre-tary of State 
34 
Elections Divi-
sion 
 
 
 
